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ABSTRACT 
 
 Three new probalistic assessments of oil resources by the United States 
Geological Survey and the United States Minerals Management Service result in an 
expansion of global remaining conventional world oil resource estimates.  The new value 
used here is 3.3 trillion barrels; the comparable earlier 1991 assessment was 2.1 trillion 
barrels.  Using optimal control depletion theory, a global monopoly has theoretical net 
present value economic rent of $22 trillion, with supply-demand quantity equilibria 
peaking in about 85 years, then declining to exhaustion in 25-30 years.  However, actual 
global markets (as distinct from theoretical markets) operate in a game theoretic-
framework.  The Persian Gulf-OPEC team of exporters (accompanied by Norway and 
Mexico) faces the United States- Organization for Economic Co-operation and 
Development team of importers.  The acceptable price range before September 11 was 
$23 - $30 per barrel.  The Persian Gulf continues to be the major locus of world oil 
resources, and has production costs (including return on capital and a risk allowance) at 
$5 per barrel or less
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I.  The Data on Remaining Resources 
 The U.S. Geological Survey recently published its estimates of global oil 
resources outside the United States (USGS 2000).  The U.S. Minerals Management 
Service also released its estimates of Federal outer continental shelf resources (USMMS 
2000).  Taken together, and combined with the earlier analysis of on-shore U.S. 
petroleum resources (USGS 1995b), the three assessments provide a global snapshot for 
the mid-1990's.  Table 1 shows one possible summary of these data.  (The concepts are 
explained in Table 2.) 
 These estimates have grown significantly beyond earlier world assessments.  In 
Figure 1, each curve is identified by the year of publication.  They are based upon the 
original endowment concept; this partially neutralizes the impact of cumulative 
production on comparability in the 17 years spanned by the estimates.  For the latest 
assessment, the graph suggests a 95% probability that original endowment was at least 
2.3 trillion barrels.  There is, apparently, a small probability of 5% that the endowment 
was as high as 3.9 trillion barrels.  The 5% estimates are generally used here, because 
they approximate the increased recovery associated with higher future oil prices. 
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Table 1.  Probability 5% Estimates of Remaining World Oil Resources (billion barrels) 
 
Category Amount 
Proved Reserves 883 
Potential Reserve Expansion 1,101 
Undiscovered Resources 1,290 
Total Remaining Resources 3,274 
Note:  The 2000 Assessment data have been organized on a benchmark 
date of January 1, 1995.  Production in the 6 years 1995-2000 
was 144 billion barrels.  Remaining resources as of January 1, 
2001, would be 3.13 trillion barrels (3,274 billion less 144 billion, 
rounded to 3.13 trillion).  World cumulative production 1859 
through 2000 was 883 billion barrels, resulting in an original 
endowment figure of 4.01 trillion barrels.  See text. 
 
Sources: USGS 2000, USMMS 2000, USGS 1995b. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
Table 2.  Concepts in Resource Definition 
 
A.  Proved Reserves – Economically recoverable conventional crude oil at known fields and reservoirs, estimated directly by 
engineering as well as geological data.  Similar to an inventory concept. 
B.  Potential Reserve Expansion – Identified reserves expected to be developed in existing fields through improved recovery, extensions, 
revisions, and the addition of new reservoirs and pools. 
C.  Undiscovered Resources – Geological extrapolation of potential crude oil based upon knowledge of geological formations outside 
existing fields.  A probabilistic concept. 
D.  Total Remaining Resources – An estimate of total conventional crude oil available for recovery; the sum of the preceding categories. 
E.  Original Endowment – The amount of oil existing before production began in 1859.  It combines the amount of cumulative 
production to date with the remaining resources estimate. 
Sources:  USGS 1995b, Chapman 1993. 
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Figure 1.  Change in Probability Distribution of Original Resources Estimates 
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 There are two major differences in the latest analysis.  First, potential reserve 
expansion now plays a significant role in reserve analysis; it constitutes one-third of the 
remaining resource estimate.  In contrast, there has essentially been no change in the 
undiscovered resource estimates.  For example, the 1991 value at the 5% probability level 
was 1.0 trillion barrels; the estimate nine years later was 1.3 trillion barrels.  Proved 
reserves at 883 billion barrels in 2000 were actually 170 billion barrels lower than the 
earlier and more broadly defined identified reserves. 
 In other words:  the estimates of proved reserves and undiscovered resources 
combined are only slightly different for 2000 than for 1991.  The growth is in the 
delineation of potential expansion in existing fields.  Table 3 compares the two 
assessments. 
 A second important difference between the 1991 and 2000 analyses is that the 
United States sees an actual increase in the remaining resource estimate, and a higher 
percentage of global remaining resources.  The current estimate at the 5% probability 
level, including both Artic National Wildlife Refuge (ANWR) and OCS data, is 277 
billion barrels for the U.S.  This gain from the 1991 U.S. assessment to the 2000 analysis 
is primarily due to two factors:  the potential reserve expansion estimate of 60 billion 
barrels, and the increased delineation of OCS (approximately outer-continental shelf) 
resources, now at 102 billion barrels. 
 One important conclusion is unchanged in the new assessment:  the Persian Gulf 
and the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) continue to dominate the 
resource picture.  OPEC had 50% of the world's original endowment, but has produced 
only 10% of that initial amount.  In contrast, the Organization for Economic Cooperation 
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Table 3.  Differences in 2000 and 1991 Estimates  
(5% probability level, billion barrels) 
 
Year of Assessment 
Publication: 2000 1991 
Identified/Proved Reserves 883 1,050 
Undiscovered Resources 1,290 1,000 
Sum of Identified/Proved and 
Undiscovered Resources 2,173 2,050 
Potential Reserve Expansion 1,101 nc 
Total Remaining Resources 3,274 2,050 
Note:  "nc" means not calculated for the 1991 assessment; see text. 
 
Source:  Table 1, USGS 1991. 
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and Development (OECD) countries as a group and the U.S. individually have each 
produced more than 50% of their original endowment.  Production has been declining in 
the U.S. since 1970, and has reached a peak in the North Sea.   
 Consider the long history of development of the methodology of resource 
estimation and its reflection in Figure 1:  It would seem premature to conclude that the 
latest estimates will not themselves be superceded in the future by higher values.   
 
II.  Impact on Crude Oil Prices 
 Notwithstanding the large proportional growth in the U.S. resource estimates, it is 
unlikely that crude oil prices globally or in the U.S. will decline in the future.  In fact, the 
potential development of the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge (ANWR) is a factor 
supporting crude oil prices in the upper end of the current $23 - $30 price range.  (This is 
discussed in a later section.) 
 In Hammoudeh's recent work (2001), he analyzes the interactions of target price 
and the OPEC quantity ceiling with actual prices and quantities for the years 1988-2000 
with monthly data.  He uses a reference price of $21 per barrel for his 13 year data set, 
and believes that OPEC replaced the reference price with a price band centered on $21.  
He finds that his model does well in fitting the data.  In a related paper, Tang and 
Hammoudeh (2001) propose a price band of $15 - $25 for the 1988-1999 period.  They 
find this model fits their data well, although it is in only partial agreement with Figure 2. 
Figure 2 represents the price range system as it has existed from 1986 to mid-
2001.  The old price range was $15-$20; the new range is $23-$30.  This price structure
9 
Figure 2.  Target Price Ranges: Old and New 
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was introduced previously in Contemporary Economic Policy (CEP), in Chapman and 
Khanna 2000, 2001, and also in Chapman 2000.  It is essentially a game-theoretic 
explanation as summarized in Table 4.  The OECD countries, led by the United States, 
constitute the oil import team.  The OPEC-Persian Gulf countries, led by Saudi Arabia, 
constitute the oil export team.  Each side, as shown in Table 4, prefers the price range 
structure because of the consequences of the anticipated response of the other side if 
crude oil prices move outside the range.   
 Production cost is the full cost to the producer of bringing crude oil to the surface, 
gathering it, and making it accessible to buyers.  It includes a return on investment and a 
risk premium.  Scarcity or depletion rent is not included in production cost.  On a global 
basis, production costs range from below $5 per barrel in the Persian Gulf to $15 per 
barrel in the North Sea and Alaska.  Anticipated ANWR production costs are on the order 
of $25 per barrel (Chapman 2000, Chapman and Khanna 2000). 
Economic theory shows us that low cost resources will be fully exploited before 
higher cost locations are brought into production.  This is clearly not the case in world oil 
markets, where the political and security considerations in Table 4 assume equal 
importance with economic factors.  (Please see the earlier CEP articles for a fuller 
explanation of production costs, price range, and issues in military security.) 
There is no basis to believe that the new resource assessments will change the 
existing price structure and its political, military, and economic framework. 
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Table 4: General Economic Impact of Crude Oil Price Decision–Making  
in a Game Theory Price Range Framework 
 
2000-01  
Price per barrel 
 
OECD Countries 
 
Persian Gulf Oil Producers 
$15 or less • higher GNP growth 
• shut some domestic production 
• greatly increased oil 
consumption 
• much more imports 
• more pollution, climate change 
• end Persian Gulf political 
support by OECD oil industry 
 
• loss of political support from 
OECD oil industry 
• lower revenue, greater volume 
• internal economic problems 
• faster depletion 
• higher market share 
$23 - $30 • stable GNP growth 
• stable OECD oil production 
• slow growth in oil consumption 
• slow growth in import share 
• stable prices 
• ANWR production feasible 
• continued Persian Gulf support 
• continued OECD political, 
military support 
• stable revenue, rent 
• higher revenue, rent 
• cooperation with OECD oil 
industry 
 
$40 • decline in GNP growth 
• rapid near-term growth domestic 
production 
• stable or declining consumption 
• ANWR production profitable 
• OECD Persian Gulf support 
opposed by oil consumers 
 
• loss of OECD political, military 
support 
• increased incentives for Central 
Asia, other non-OPEC 
production 
• less market share 
• less production, more profit, rent 
• greater payoff to successful Iraq-
type action 
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III.  The New Resource Estimates and the Magnitude of Economic Rent 
 If the global oil market were to be wholly competitive, crude oil price would be 
determined by the marginal cost of Persian Gulf producers.  A competitive price would 
be on the order of $5 per barrel.  In contrast, a truly monopolistic structure would result 
in a price on the order of $40 per barrel. 
 Depletion theory, extended to incorporate market structure and dynamic upward-
shifting demand functions, can provide the tools to estimate quantities of production and 
consumption, economic rent, and optimal years to depletion.  The basic goal, for a 
monopoly, is to maximize 
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Here, tq  is the path of market-equilibrium quantities that maximize the present value of 
economic rent for a monopoly.  The optimal number of years to depletion is T.  P is the 
inverse demand function, which shifts in response to growing world population (N) and 
per capita income (Y).  C is cost, r is the discount rate, X is cumulative production, and S 
is the estimate of remaining resources at the beginning of the initial period.  (The 
methodology is described previously at length in CEP, in Chapman and Khanna 2000, 
2001, and also Chapman 2000 and Khanna and Chapman 2001.)  
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 A quantitative solution to the maximum net present value of rent is shown as the 
higher curve in Figure 3.  Optimal T is 111.78 years.  Optimal q starts at 17 billion 
barrels annually, peaks in 77 years at an annual output level of 38 billion barrels, and then 
declines to depletion.  This analysis assumes that S is 3.13 trillion barrels, as explained in 
Table 1. 
 The earlier value for remaining resources S is reflected in the lower curve in the 
Figure.  The geometric area under each tq  trajectory is equal to the appropriate S.  The 
numerical results are summarized in Table 5.  They are initially counter-intuitive.  The 
remaining resource assessment has increased 48%, to 3.13 trillion barrels.  However, the 
present value of economic rent grows only 8%, and T is increased only 18 years, or 20%.  
The explanation, of course, is discounting at high values of T. 
 Notwithstanding the two-decimal values in Table 5, these results should be seen 
as rough approximations, indicating the considerable magnitude of economic rent 
associated with the world's remaining oil resources.  With $20 trillion as the order-of-
magnitude value for economic rent, it is comparable to the global gross economic 
product, itself $29 trillion in 1998 (World Bank 2000). 
 However, as discussed with the Table 4 concepts, this high level of economic rent 
is only one of many important financial, political, and military factors that define the 
game-theoretic framework for the target price range.   
13 
Figure 3.  Supply-Demand Equilibria with Old & New Resource Estimates 
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Table 5.  The Impact of Higher Remaining Resource Estimates 
 
 1991 Resource 
Assessment 
2000 Resource 
Assessment 
S, Remaining world resources 2.12 T bl 3.13 T bl 
T, optimal years to depletion 93.51 years 111.78 years 
Π , net present value rent $20.7 T $22.4 T 
Consumers surplus $8.0 T $9.3 T 
Social welfare $28.7 T $31.7 T 
r, interest rate 5% 5% 
Notes:  "T bl" represents trillion barrels, and "$T" is trillion dollars.  
Social welfare is simply the sum of rent and consumers' surplus.  On a 
future value basis, the 2000 assessment rent has a value of slightly more 
than $7 quadrillion. 
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IV.  Economics, Resources, and ANWR 
 Economics plays a growing role in the geological estimates of petroleum 
resources.  In the early 1990's, conventional crude oil resource assessment had $50 per 
barrel as the ceiling for feasible production.  For example, if new oil in Western New 
York could be produced at a cost of $75 per barrel, this would not have been included in 
the estimates.   
 In the U.S., the cost analysis for undiscovered conventional crude oil estimates 
that 9 billion barrels would be producible at $18 per barrel, and 22 billion barrels at $50 
per barrel (USGS 1995b). 
 Similar analysis for Alaska's Artic National Wildlife Refuge is more complex 
(USEIA 2000).  Using USGS assessments for conventional crude oil in ANWR, the 
Energy Information Administration analyzed, the interaction between probabilistic 
resource estimates of undiscovered oil with incremental cost.  Their complex findings can 
be approximated in a simplified form as  
 
 
 
 
 )]F95(.444.82.4[]614.)18$P(0342[.CDQ −∗+∗+−∗=    (2) 
 24$P18$ ≤≤ ,  %95F%5 ≤≤ . 
 
 
 
 
Here CDQ is the commercially developable crude oil in ANWR in billions of barrels, P is 
assumed U.S. imports refiner acquisition price, dollars per barrel (in constant year 2000 
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dollars).  F is assumed probability.  For example, with assumptions for price at $22 and 
probability at 0.50, the result is an estimate of 6 billion barrels from ANWR. 
 When these data are examined in the context of the game-theoretic price range, an 
important question arises.  Would ANWR production be feasible at the old price range of 
$15 to $20?  Probably not.  In fact, prices in the upper end of the current price range ($23 
to $30) are probably necessary to insure a high probability of profit from ANWR 
development.   
 A corollary question follows:  are high gasoline prices necessary for ANWR 
petroleum production? 
 
V.  Summary 
 The new USGS assessments of remaining resources have some limited 
implications for current policy.  Because of the explicit inclusion of potential reserve 
expansion, the probability distribution has shifted considerably.  Roughly one trillion 
barrels have been added to the estimate of remaining global resources.   
 Although there is a U.S. increase, OPEC and the Persian Gulf continue to have 
one-half of world resources, and the lowest production costs.  (Persian Gulf production 
costs are on the order of $5 per barrel, including return on investment and a risk 
allowance.) 
 Globally, cumulative production is 20% to 25% of the original endowment, 
although the U.S. has used more than half of its original amount.   
 Since 1986, the world oil market has been characterized by a target price range 
structure.  It is based upon a system resembling basic game theory:  OECD importers and 
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OPEC exporters (with Norway and Mexico) balance their economic, political, and 
military interests with a stable price.  The new range is $23 - $30 per barrel; the old range 
was $15 - $20.  The target price range is too high to be purely competitive and too low to 
be purely monopolistic; it represents a pragmatic policy. 
 If the world oil industry were to be a pure monopoly, the net present value of 
economic rent above production cost would be on the order of $20 trillion.  This estimate 
is derived from an optimal control depletion theory analysis which incorporates upwardly 
shifting demand functions that rise in response to growing world population and income.  
In this analysis, with the new remaining resource estimate of 3 trillion barrels, optimal 
use peaks in 77 years.  According to the analysis, depletion is 112 years in the future.  Of 
course this is heuristic rather than precise prediction. 
 With respect to ANWR, its potential development is dependent upon crude oil 
price.  If the old target price range ($15 - $20 per barrel) still prevailed, development 
probably would not be feasible.  With the new target price range ($23 - $30 per barrel), 
ANWR development is profitable, especially at the higher end of the range.  It seems that 
the new, higher target price range is essential if ANWR is to be developed.  Put simply, 
ANWR development in the United States requires high international crude prices. 
 Given these facts:  (1) U.S. production exAlaska peaked in 1970, and has declined 
50% to 1.8 billion barrels annually, and (2) Alaskan production peaked in 1988, and has 
also declined 50%, to 350 million barrels annually, it seems improbable that even the 
most aggressive policy for increased production on public land could reverse the decline 
in total U.S. production for a significant period. 
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 U.S. remaining resources (277 billion barrels at the 5% probability level) are high 
cost and often in environmentally sensitive areas.  The new USGS resource assessments 
expand both U.S. and global estimates, and the estimates for low-cost areas in the Persian 
Gulf. 
 Given the degree of stabilization in international pricing and production that has 
existed since 1985, I think serious consideration should be given to deferral of decisions 
for major current production increases in environmentally important areas. 
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